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ABSTRACT 
Smith's rent gap theory of gentrification has inspired a substantial amount 
of critical attention as well as several empirical studies. None of these 
studies addresses a fundamental problem with the rent gap hypothesis -
namely, its dependence on a distinction between actual and potential land 
rent that does not contribute to the explanation of changes in land use. 
And, contrary to some claims, there are no antecedents for the rent gap in 
the history of ideas about land economics - whether Marxian or 
neoclassical. It is concluded that the standard neoclassical concept ~of land 
use succession is more coherent than the rent gap concept. However, 
neither approach explains how neighbourhoods previously subject to 
disinvestment come to be perceived to have the potential for reinvestment 
and higher land rents. 
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THE RENT GAP DEBUNKED• 
Steven C. Bourassa 
Urban Research Program 
Neil Smith's rent gap theory of gentrification has received a 
substantial amount of critical attention since it appeared in the pages of 
the Journal of the American Planning Association in 1979. Hamnett 
and others have subjected many aspects of the theory to detailed 
criticism, yet the rent gap persists in the literature of urban geography 
as an apparently meaningful and useful concept.I Several geographers 
have even attempted to determine empirically whether the rent gap 
exists. Ley's study of Canadian cities, published in 1986, has been 
followed by Clark's work on Malmo, Sweden, Kary's on Toronto, 
Canada, and Badcock's on Adelaide, Australia.2 
One crucial problem has not received adequate attention in the 
published commentary and empirical research on the rent gap 
hypothesis. This is that the concept of a rent gap depends on a 
distinction between actual and potential land rent that does not 
• This paper was presented at the 1992 meeting of the International 
Geographical Union's Commission on Urban Systems and Development, at 
Wayne State University, Detroit. Thanks are due to Eric Clark, Chris 
Hamnett, Bill Randolph, Peter Williams, and Judy Yates for their critical 
comments, and to Neil Smith for providing copies of several of the 
references. The encouragement of Larry Bourne and other members of 
the IGU Commission is also appreciated . 
1 See Hamnett (1984, 1991 ), Beauregard (1986), and also the commentary by 
Smith (I 992a) on Hamnett's recent article. The literature review for this 
paper was greatly facilitated by the useful bibliography prepared by Smith 
and Herod (1991 ). 
2Ley (1986); Clark (1987, 1988); Kary (1988); and Badcock (1989, 1990). 
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contribute to the explanation of changes in land use.3 And, contrary to 
the assertions of Clark (1987), no importance is attached to this 
distinction in the history of land economics - whether Marxian or 
neoclassical. The concept of rent that is relevant to changes in land use 
is land rent as an opportunity cost, which is a function of the potential 
use of a site rather than its actual or current use. 
This paper will begin with a brief sketch of the rent gap theory, 
an outline of basic terminology, and a discussion of some 
terminological problems evident in Smith's exposition of the theory. 
The next section of the paper will discuss the theoretical difficulties 
with Smith's concepts of rent and will conclude with a critique of 
attempts to find theoretical antecedents for the rent gap. The third 
section will highlight the difficulties in applying the rent gap concept 
that are evident in the empirical applications by Ley, Clark, Kary, and 
Hadcock. The paper concludes with a discussion of alternatives to the 
rent gap concept. 
THE RENT GAP THEORY 
A BRIEF OUTLINE OF THE THEORY 
Part of the attraction of the rent gap theory is its elegance, 
although this is unfortunately achieved at the expense of an over-
simplified understanding of the process of gentrification (Hamnett, 
1991). But, given the theory's simplicity, it can be outlined fairly 
quickly. Smith defined the rent gap as "the disparity between the 
potential ground rent level and the actual ground rent capitalized under 
3 An analogous problem has led to confusion in the debate about the 
economic effects of taxes on land (Tideman, 1982; Bourassa, t 992b). 
3 
the present land use" (Smith, 1979b, p. 545). The existence of a 
significant rent gap makes inner-city reinvestment attractive due to the 
potential for earning substantial increments in land rent and value. 
Moreover, it is argued that rent gaps form due to an intrinsic 
tendency for capitalist urban development to be cyclical. Initial 
investment in an area is later followed by disinvestment as investors 
seek more profitable opportunities elsewhere - in this case, suburban 
locations. Disinvestment eventually leads to a substantial disparity 
between the value or rent of land in its current use and its potential 
value if redeveloped or, in the case of gentrification, reused for a 
different purpose. This rent gap provides the incentive for investment 
to return to the inner city. Thus gentrification is essentially "a back to 
the city movement by capital, not people," to quote the subtitle of 
Smith's influential paper.4 
The discussion that follows focuses on the concepts of rent that 
underlie the rent gap hypothesis, and their significance for explanation 
of urban change. This paper is not concerned with the assertion that 
urban development in capitalist economies tends to involve a cyclical 
process of investment, disinvestment, and reinvestment; however, it 
must be remarked that this process does not seem inevitable, as many 
neighbourhoods never experience disinvestment (Wong, 1988), 
although perhaps this observation depends on the definition of 
disinvestment. In any case, that is a topic for another paper. This 
paper is concerned instead to eliminate some imprecision in the basic 
concepts of rent employed to analyze processes of urban development. 
Such imprecision can cloud understanding or divert researchers to 
pursue misguided aims. 
4 Smith continues to endorse the rent gap concept in his most recent 
theoretical work on gentrification (Smith, 1986, 1987a, 1987b). 
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BASIC TERMINOLOGY 
It is important to define some basic concepts so that the following 
discussion does not become stalled in a morass of gobbledygook. There 
are essentially two broad categories of rent relevant to the present 
discussion.5 One is the accounting sense, which refers to the actual cash 
flows from a leaseholder to a landowner. The other is the economic 
sense that is defined in terms of the opportunity cost of the rents that 
could be obtained from the most intensive feasible alternative use of a 
site.6 Generally, Smith uses actual rent to mean the accounting cash 
flow and potential rent to mean the economic opportunity cost. The 
present paper will adopt a more or less standard usage of contract rent 
to refer to the cash flow and land rent to refer to the opportunity cost. 
These terms are set out in Table 1 so that they may be referred to 
readily. Table 1 also includes some of the terms used by Marx, 
Marshall, and Gaffney in their discussions of rent, which will be 
considered later. 
5 Economists often prefer to speak in terms of land rent rather than / and 
value, and discussion of the rent gap has followed that tradition. The 
relationship between the two concepts is quite simple. If L is the market 
value of the land, E is the expected annual land rent, and r is the expected 
real rate of interest, then L = E/r. With annual property taxes of b, then L = 
E/(r + b). 
6The distinction between accounting and economic rent parallels that 
between accounting and economic profit. While the accounting concepts 
take into account only explicit costs, the economic ones also involve 
implicit opportunity costs. This distinction is often explained in 
introductory economics textbooks (see, for example, Dolan, 1983, pp. 431-3). 
Table 1. Rent Terminology 
Sense 
Usage Accounting Economic 
Present paper Contract rent Land rent 
Smith Actual rent Potential rent 
Marx Ground rent 
Marshall Ground rent 
Gaffney Contract rent Land or ground rent 
It should be noted that the authors listed in Table 1 sometimes use 
other terms to mean the same things; the terms listed are those 
employed most commonly. For example, Smith sometimes uses 
capitalized ground rent as a synonym for actual rent, and Marshall uses 
annual site value as a synonym for ground rent. Gaffney uses land rent 
and ground rent interchangeably, and it is undoubtedly true that in 
common usage either of these terms may also refer to the accounting 
cash flow between a leaseholder and a landowner. And, just to confuse 
matters a bit further, Marx occasionally uses actual rent, but it is 
clearly meant to be the equivalent of ground rent.7 
SOME TERMINOLOGICAL PROBLEMS 
One immediately obvious problem with Smith's exposition of the 
rent gap theory is that he misuses terms that have well-established 
meanings in the land economics literature (Marxian as well as 
neoclassical). These terminological mistakes are relatively minor in 
7 Marx uses Lhc term actual rent in his review of Ricardo's theory of rent 
(Marx, 1988-91, Vol. 31). 
6 
comparison to the basic problem of the rent gap hypothesis. They 
merit discussion here only because they suggest that Smith's 
formulation of the rent gap notion was at least somewhat na"ive and that 
the basic concepts underlying the rent gap need careful critical scrutiny. 
One terminological error is Smith's substitution of the term 
ground ·rent for land value.s He does this to emphasize the fact that 
land value cannot be construed to be the result of labour power, unlike 
the value of other commodities, but this seems a rather crude attempt to 
follow Marxian doctrine and his usage only confuses matters.9 The 
confusion stems from the fact that rent implies a periodic, or recurring, 
payment, while value is a once-only payment. Land value is therefore 
typically defined as the present value of an expected stream of future 
land rents . Smith makes the error of substituting the one concept 
directly for the other while also neglecting the systematic relationship 
between them. 
A second confusion is in Smith's use of the term capitalized 
ground rent. To most students of land economics, including both Marx 
and the neoclassical economists, this is the same as land value. The 
process of converting an expected stream of future rents into a present 
value is known as capitalization. But Smith employs the term in a most 
unusual sense to refer to "the actual quantity of ground rent that is 
appropriated by the landowner, given the present use" (Smith, l 979b, 
8smith (l979b), pp. 542-3: "A further complication with housing is that the 
sale price represents not only the value of the house, but an additional 
component for rent since the land is generally sold along with the 
structures it accommodates. Here it is · preferable to talk of ground rent 
rather than land value, since the price of land does not re flect a quantity 
of labor power applied to it, as with the value of commodities proper." 
9 Although Marx himself uses the term ground rent , he certainly did not 
consider it to be synonymous with land value . 
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p. 543). Here the term is synonymous with actual rent. Smith's 
confusion on this point is well-illustrated by his use of capitalized 
. ground rent later in the same paragraph in a context that clearly implies 
a present value: "In the case of owner-occupancy, ground rent is 
capitalized when the building is sold and therefore appears as part of 
the sale price. Thus sale price = house value + capitalized ground rent" 
(Smith, 1979b, p. 543). 
THEORETICAL ISSUES 
CONCEPTS OF RENT 
According to Smith, for any given site there is, on the one hand, 
a potential rent, based on its so-called "highest and best use,"10 and 
there is also an actual rent, based on its existing use. The difference 
between these two amounts is the rent gap. Intuitively, this seems quite 
reasonable. But common sense is often misleading in economic matters. 
A more careful analysis reveals that the difference between the 
accounting cash flow and the economic opportunity cost (that is, the 
"rent gap") has little direct relevance for the allocation of land use. 
This is because it is only land rent as an opportunity cost that has any 
clear economic significance. The economically significant form of rent 
1 0 A recent treatment of the concept of highest and best use can be found 
in Dotzour et al. (1990). The reference to "so-called" highest and best use is 
an allusion to the fact that the highest and best use from a private 
landowner's point of view is often not the same as that from a social point 
of view due to the existence of externalities and public goods. Dotzour et al. 
note that although highest and best use has traditionally been identified 
with the private landowner's point of view, social costs and benefits began 
to be incorporated into the concept in the 1970s. 
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is independent of the current use of a site: it is a function of the site's 
highest and best use. This highest and best use is a function of uses on 
surrounding sites and is the use to which the site would be put if it were 
bare. As Gaffney puts it, land rent is best defined as "the highest latent 
opportunity cost of land" (Gaffney, 1969, p. 141). This sense of land 
rent is equivalent to Smith's potential rent. 
This is not to deny that actual rent may exist in the form of rents 
actually appropriated by land owners - that is, contract rent. But land 
rents are rarely appropriated as such by landowners: "most land is held 
by individuals or firms that use the land in conjunction with other 
inputs to yield an aggregate return that cannot be allocated 
unambiguously among inputs" (Tideman, 1982, p. 109). Moreover, 
even when land is owned separately from other inputs and contract rent 
can be observed, it has at best a very dubious theoretical significance. 
This is in part because contract rent has at best imprecise implications 
for changes in land use or occupancy. 
Contract rent is usually set to approximate what Smith calls 
potential rent. The landlord typically wants to collect at least the 
opportunity cost of a site, while the leaseholder is willing to pay at most 
that amount. When contract rent does not approximate potential rent, 
that implies that: (1) the site is being held speculatively in anticipation 
of future redevelopment or sale; (2) some kind of subsidy or other 
adjustment is involved; or (3) the parties to the lease miscalculated the 
site's potential rent. The latter is particularly likely to occur in the case 
of a long-term lease, or during periods of rapid, unpredictable change. 
In these cases contract (or actual) rent departs from land (or potential) · 
rent, but not in any systematic way. 
As an example, consider a site in the central business district of a 
large city that is held vacant in anticipation of an optimal future date 
9 
for redevelopment. The site yields no actual rent while it remains 
vacant, yet it has a substantial potential rent. Alternatively, it might be 
feasible to lease the site for car parking during the period prior to 
redevelopment, in which case the actual rent would be greater than 
zero. The fact that the rent gap in the former case is greater than that 
in the latter has no bearing on the potential use of the site or the timing 
of redevelopment, which are the same in the two cases. 
An analogous example involving gentrification may easily be 
constructed. Consider the case of two identical adjacent houses in a 
gentrifying neighbourhood. Both are held by a speculator in 
anticipation of resale and rehabilitation. One is vacant, while the other 
yields modest rents from relatively low income tenants. While there is 
no actual rent in the former case, at least part of the rent paid in the 
second case could be imputed to land. Here again, there is a large rent 
gap in one case and a smaller gap in the other, but this difference in 
magnitude has no bearing on the potential use of the properties, because 
each is equally likely to be rehabilitated and occupied by relatively high 
income owners or tenants. 
At this point it might be argued that it is the existence of a rent 
gap, rather than its magnitude for any particular property, that signals 
the likelihood of gentrification (or, more generally, development or 
redevelopment). This is more or less correct as far as it goes. But it 
merely reiterates in a relatively imprecise manner the obvious fact that, 
in a capitalist economy, land is more likely to be developed or 
redeveloped the more profitable it becomes to do so. This does not 
contribute anything to an explanation of why certain deteriorated and 
derelict areas of inner cities have become desirable residential 
neighbourhoods . The really interesting question for research on 
gentrification (and urban development generally) is not to measure 
10 
differences between actual and potential rents, but rather to explain 
changes in potential rents over time.11 The rent gap simply attempts to 
measure in a rather crude way certain conditions associated with land 
use change without explaining how those conditions came about. 
Clark (1992) has attempted to defend the rent gap hypothesis in a 
recent paper.12 In that paper, he makes much of a supposed "one and 
only land value" that he somehow associates with the argument that 
actual rent has no economic importance. He claims that this represents 
an overemphasis on long-term static equilibria in land markets and 
ignores the dynamics of urban development that form the motivation 
for the rent gap thesis. Clark also mentions that the land economist 
Gaffney places considerable emphasis on urban dynamics in his 
discussion of land rent. But it is not at all clear why the claim that 
potential rent is the only economically significant form of rent should 
in any way imply a neglect of urban dynamics. Indeed, the very word 
potential implies a focus on growth and change, and the concept is 
entirely consistent with Gaffney's idea of land rent and its role in 
allocating a continually changing pattern of land uses. While Gaffney 
(1962) mentions a distinction between contract rent and land (or 
"ground") rent, he essentially discards the former as lacking any 
analytic interest because it is only the latter that is relevant to, among 
other things, the allocation of land among users and the timing of 
redevelopment. 
1 I Note that rent gaps are not unique to gentrifying ncighborhoods, but 
could be found in any developing area. Indeed, substantial rent gaps would . 
be likely to occur at the fringe of a developing city where agricultural and 
vacant land is being held in anticipation of conversion to urban uses. This 
also means that the existence of a rent gap does not necessarily imply that 
"disinvestment" has occurred . 
12 Clark's paper is in part a response to Bourassa (1990). 
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THEORETICAL ANTECEDENTS FOR THE RENT GAP? 
While Smith makes no attempt to find antecedents for the rent 
gap in the history of economic ideas, Clark claims to find at least 
indirect support for the concept in the work of Marx, Marshall, and 
others: "That the rent gap exists in reality and constitutes an important 
force of urban change is supported not only by 'common sense,' but by 
the auxiliary hypotheses of such very different schools of thought as 
neoclassical economics and Marxian political economy" (Clark, 1987, p. 
86). It will be convenient for the purposes of the present paper to focus 
on the ideas of Marshall and Marx since they present paradigmatic 
expressions of neoclassical and Marxian concepts of urban land rent. 
Clark seems to find the most direct corroboration of the rent gap 
concept in Marshall's Principles of Economics, from which he quotes a 
long passage. It is worth reproducing this passage, in part to 
demonstrate how it has been misinterpreted and in part because it makes 
an important point about urban land rent: 
We have already seen that the ground rent which a builder 
is willing to pay for any site is governed by his estimate of the 
additional value which that site will give to the buildings erected 
on it. ... 
He contrives to the best of his ability that the site and the 
house (or other building), which he puts on it, shall be 
permanently appropriate the one to the other. In so far as he 
succeeds, the rent of the property at any future time is the sum of 
its annual site value and the annual value of the building . .. 
As time goes on, the purchasing power of money may 
change; the class of house for which that site is suitable is likely 
to change; and the technique of building is certain to be 
1 2 
improved. Consequently, the total annual value of the property 
at a later date consists of its annual site value, together with 
profits on the cost of building a house giving accommodation 
equally desirable at that date with the existing house. But all this 
is subject to the dominant condition that the general character of 
the house has remained appropriate to its site: if it has not, no 
precise statement as to the relation between total value, site v~lue 
and building value can be made. If for instance a warehouse or a 
dwelling house of quite a different character is needed to develop 
the full resources of the site, the total value of the property as it 
stands may be less than its site value alone. For the site value 
cannot be developed without pulling down those buildings and 
erecting new (Marshall, 1961, pp. 796-7; cited in Clark, 1987, p. 
56). 
Clark follows the quotation with this statement: "The point Marshall 
makes here is that site value is independent of actual total value, the 
latter being comprised of building value and the actually realized 
ground rent (which the existing building sets limits on)" (Clark, 1987, 
p. 56). But a careful reading of Marshall reveals that he does not imply 
t~ilt the existing use sets limits on contract rent - what Clark refers to 
here as "actually realized ground rent". Marshall is not saying anything 
about contract rent; he is merely pointing out that land value may 
exceed total property value if the value of the building is negative (due 
to demolition costs) . Marshall 's point is precisely that the existing 
building does not set limits on land value or rent. As Marshall says 
elsewhere in Principles of Economics: "site value . . . is governed by 
causes which are mostly beyond the control of him who determines 
what buildings shall be put on it . . . " (Marshall, 1961, p. 445). 
Clark includes his discussion of Smith's rent gap hypothesis in a 
chapter titled "Urban Applications of Marxian Land Rent Theory." It 
13 
is revealing to observe that: (1) Clark does not explain the connections 
between Marxian concepts of land rent and Smith's theory and (2) 
Smith himself identifies no such connections. In regard to the latter 
point, it should be noted that Smith mentions Marx only in passing in 
his influential paper on the rent gap. Moreover, Smith mentions Marx 
while endorsing the labour theory of value in the context of a discussion 
of house value, a matter that is not relevant to his fundamental 
distinction between actual and potential land rent. It is true that Smith's 
critique of the consumer sovereignty assumptions of neoclassical 
economics and his emphasis on the production side of the production-
consumption equation are squarely within the Marxian tradition, but 
these aspects of the rent gap hypothesis in no way rely on any Marxian 
concepts of land rent.13 
Although Marx distinguishes several kinds of land rent, he does 
not devote attention to anything corresponding to Smith's actual rent 
(Marx, 1990, especially Part 6). Marx identifies three forms of land 
rent - absolute, monopoly, and differential - of which the last is 
divided into two subtypes - differential rent I and differential rent II. 
These components of land rent are summarized in Table 2. In regard 
to absolute rent, Marx argues that landlords will require rent to be paid 
on even the worst land under cultivation and that this is a consequence 
of the institution of landed property. If all land were used by owner-
occupiers, then the requirement of absolute rent would no longer 
prevent marginal land from being cultivated. Evans (1988) has 
suggested that transaction costs and uncertainty about the future may 
I 3The links between Marxian thought and Smith's theory of gentrification 
are made more explicit in Smith (1979a, 1982, 1984) and Smith and LeFaivre 
(1984); however, none of these publications discusses Marx's concepts of 
land rent. 
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account for the existence of absolute rent. Monopoly rent, which is 
discussed only briefly by Marx, refers to rent that "may arise if the 
product or service derived from a few sites may only be obtained from 
those sites and so the owner of the site has a monopoly over the 
provision of the product or service by virtue of his ownership of the 
site" (Evans, 1991, p. 7).14 This is simply the standard concept of 
monopolistic profits applied to land rents. 
Marx's concepts of differential rent seem at first sight potentially 
more relevant to the subject at hand. Differential rent I refers to the 
rent that arises from the differential fertility or locational advantage of 
land. This is quite similar to Ricardo's and von Thiinen's concepts of 
land rent. In contrast, differential rent 11 is a somewhat more 
complicated concept. It refers to the rent that arises from the 
application of different amounts of capital to lands that otherwise would 
be equally productive. This could apply to the same land over time -
as, for example, when increases in population result in a more intensive 
use of land and corresponding increases in land rent. Similarly, 
increases in land rent due to improvements in technology allowing 
more intensive use of land would also be in the form of differential rent 
II. It should be noted that Marx departs from Ricardian marginal 
analysis in his discussion of differential rent II, assuming that price is 
based on the average product. Aside from this point, which is not 
relevant to the present issue, Marx's concepts of differential rent are 
14 Marx sometimes uses the word mon o p o l y loosely to refer to the general 
monopolistic control over land use maintained by landowners (Marx, 1990, 
Part 6 , Chapters 38 and 45) . The · land rents arising from private· 
landownership are typically in the form of differential or absolute rents; 
however, the term monopoly rent here refers to a form distinct from 
ei ther of those two types. Marx refe rs to this distinct type of monopoly 
rent in Chapter 46. 
quite compatible with neoclassical concepts of land rent.15 
Table 2. Marx's Components of Land Rent 
Component 
Absolute rent 
Monopoly rent 
Differential rent 
Differential rent I 
Differential rent II 
Sources 
Transaction costs, uncertainty 
Monopoly ownership of sites with scarce 
productive capabilities 
Fertility, locational advantages 
Technological change, population growth 
IS 
None of the elements of land rent distinguished by Marx involves 
an actual, as opposed to potential, form of rent. Marx does not even 
allude to such a distinction in his primary discussion of land rent, which 
is in Volume 3 of Capital. Nor is there any such allusion in his other 
major discussion of land rent, in Theories of Surplus Value.16 Clearly, 
Marx was concerned essentially with rent in its economic, rather than 
accounting, sense. Moreover, Clark's assertion of both neoclassical and 
Marxian support for the rent gap concept must be rejected because it is 
not supported by the evidence. 
EMPIRICAL ATTEMPTS 
With the aim of making this discussion somewhat less abstract, 
the following paragraphs consider how theoretical problems with the 
l 5 An extended discussion of differential rent may be found in Evans 
( 1992) . 
16 Sec particularly the discussions of Rodbertus', Anderson's, Ricardo's, and 
Adam Smith's theories of rent in Marx (1988-91), Vol. 31, roughly pp. 250-
399 and 457-580. 
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rent gap are reflected in empirical attempts to measure it. t 7 It is not 
surprising that researchers have had difficulty in applying the concepts 
of actual and potential rent. As noted previously, actual rent rarely 
appears as such and, even when it does, the relevant data are unlikely to 
be available. Potential rent is also difficult to measure, although it 
could be derived from property tax records, which typically give 
separate appraised values for land and improvements. Unfortunately, 
local property tax appraisals are notoriously unreliable and, among 
other problems, are slow to reflect changes in value. While empirical 
attempts to measure the rent gap have stumbled over these 
methodological hurdles, they have also suffered from interpretational 
problems. Thus the following discussion addresses interpretational as 
well as methodological issues. 
LEY'S STUDY OF CANADIAN METRO POLIT AN AREAS 
Ley's objective was to compare competing explanations of 
gentrification using a variety of data describing the 22 Census 
Metfopolitan Areas (CMAs) in Canada in 1971 and 1981 (Ley, 1986). 
Some 35 elements of data were employed in an attempt to compare four 
sets of competing explanations for gentrification involving 
demography, housing market dynamics, urban amenities, and the 
economic base. Two of the housing market elements were purportedly 
relevant to the rent gap hypothesis. These were the ratios of inner-city 
1 7 It is revealing to note that the rent gap per se plays little or no role in 
Smith's own empirical studies of gentrification (Schaffer and Smith, 1986 
[reprinted as Smith and Schaffer, 1987) ; Smith, 1989 [revised as Smith, 
1992b]; Smith, Duncan, and Reid , 1989). Although two of these studies 
include discussions of the rent gap theory, no attempt is made to actually 
measure a rent gap. 
17 
to CMA house values and house rental costs. 
It is immediately obvious that the definition of these ratios bears 
little resemblance to Smith's definition of a rent gap. Ley argues that 
they are appropriate measures of the rent gap because a low ratio 
represents a situation in which there is considerable incentive to re-
invest in the inner city: 
The rent gap thesis argues that the more depreciated the inner-
city land market, the higher the probability of reinvestment and 
gentrification. But this reinvestment is likely to occur only when 
the alternative suburban market is high priced and property . ~s in 
short supply relative to the inner city (Ley, 1986, p. 533, fn. 11). 
This assumes, however, that appropriate and attractive properties are 
available in the inner city. It is easy to imagine a situation in which 
inner-city-CMA value and rent ratios are quite low yet there is little 
or no opportunity for profitable reinvestment in inner city 
neighbourhoods. This could be due to factors such as lack of 
appropriate housing stock or buildings suitable for adaptive reuse or the 
existence of substantial negative externalities making inner city 
locations unattractive for residential use. In any case, Ley's ratios are 
not capable of demonstrating whether there was or was not a gap 
between actual and potential rent. 
Clark makes substantially the same criticism of Ley's ratios: 
As interesting as these variables may be in the context of 
geographical patterns of housing costs, they tell us nothing about 
the existence or size of any rent gap. Building and land values 
are conflated in the ratios, which neither measure capitalized land 
rent nor potential land rent. The gap measured by Ley is that 
between inner city housing costs and metropolitan housing costs, 
1 8 
which suggests that his test of the rent gap hypothesis is based on 
a misconception. He assumes the hypothesis to say that 
gentrification will take place where housing costs are lowest, 
when in fact the hypothesis states that the difference between 
potential land rent and capitalized land rent constitutes an 
economic force toward redevelopment and that redevelopment is 
therefore most likely to occur where this difference is greatest 
(Clark, 1988, p. 245; see also Smith, 1987a). 
Ley, of course, recognises the difficulty in applying the rent gap 
concept, but his solution to that problem begs the question by measuring 
something altogether different. 
CLARK'S STUDY OF MALMO, SWEDEN 
Clark tried to more directly measure the rent gap in his study of 
sections of Malmo, Sweden, during the period 1860 to 1985 (Clark, 
1987, 1988). To determine actual land rents, Clark used tax assessment 
data that distinguished between land and building values. With some 
adjustments, assessed land values are used as the basis for developing a 
series of actual land rents for each of the various study areas. On the 
other hand, a series of potential land rents was determined from bills of 
sale both just prior to the original development of sites and also just 
prior to their redevelopment. Interpolations between these values were 
based on general population and property value trends in the city. 
The use of tax assessment data as a basis for determining actual 
rent is questionable in two key respects. First, given the vagaries of 
assessment practice, it is doubtful that assessed values correspond to 
reality as closely as one would like. Furthermore, as Clark notes, 
assessments may not accurately apportion total values between land and 
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buildings. According to him: "This assumption is the one considerable 
weakness in the refined data ... " (Clark, 1987, p. 100). Unfortunately, 
there is also a much more serious problem with these data. 
The second, and more crucial, problem is that generally accepted 
tax assessment procedure requires the calculation of land value on the 
basis of highest and best use, not current use. Thus it is quite revealing 
to observe that Clark's so-called actual land rents in many cases 
anticipate future changes in use.18 If observed sales prices for vacant 
land anticipate redevelopment more rapidly than assessed values, that 
only reflects the well-known lags and other inaccuracies that plague 
property assessment. This is all too evident in the fact that the measures 
of potential and actual rent in Clark's case studies are not even the same 
at the time of redevelopment, which is precisely when the rent gap 
theory would predict they should be equal. The differences at the time 
of redevelopment are obviously due to the fact that assessed value 
continues to lag behind potential value, even when recent sale price data 
are available. They do not imply that assessors are trying to measure 
something other than potential value - that is, value in highest and best 
use. 
In a recent paper, Clark has attempted to defend his attempt to 
apply the rent gap concept (Clark, 1992). Among other things, he 
argues that assessed values do reflect current use because they remain 
quite low for many decades, only to increase dramatically just prior to 
redevelopment. This could, however, easily be explained by poor 
assessment practice or, perhaps more likely, the fact that potential land 
values may make sudden changes, rather than evolve smoothly over 
time. Indeed, it seems that Clark's method for interpolating potential 
1 Sscc. for example. Cl ark (1988) , p. 250, figure 5. 
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land rents between development and redevelopment results in 
unrealistically smooth curves. He admits this in one of his case studies, 
where there was an obvious reason for doubting that the curve would 
be so smooth.19 Because the interpolations are based on growth in 
population and assessed property values for the entire city, they almost 
certainly mask the detailed changes in perceptions about potential land 
uses and values for the small areas used as case studies. There is no 
reason to believe that these perceptions changed as smoothly as the 
interpolation procedure assumes. 
KARY'S STUDY OF TORONTO, CANADA 
Kary (1988) tried to test the rent gap hypothesis by looking at 
relative house prices in Toronto. His methods involved an attempt to 
determine whether there was a "land value valley" - or, more 
precisely, a house price valley - in inner Toronto and also an analysis 
of the evolution of house prices in the Cabbagetown/Donvale area, 
described as a prime example of gentrification in Canada. Like Ley, 
Kary was unable to measure the rent gap directly and instead simply 
compared inner city house prices with suburban ones, in the case of his 
more general study, or looked at relative house prices over time, in the 
case of the Cabbagetown/Donvale study. Neither of these approaches is 
capable of demonstrating the existence of a rent gap, because neither 
demonstrates that there was at any time a potential rent that differed 
from actual rent. Thus Clark's criticism of Ley's ratios applies with . 
equal force to Kary's measures. 
19This is the Pont us block case study, discussed in Clark (1987), pp . 131 -6. 
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BADCOCK'S STUDY OF ADELAIDE, AUSTRALIA 
Badcock (1989) attempted to determine whether there was a rent 
gap in the 30 local government areas of metropolitan Adelaide, South 
Australia, between 1970 and 1985. He applied the actual rent concept 
using a measure of combined house and land value based on sales 
prices, on the assumption that actual value (rent) will be something less 
than total property value (rent). Potential value (rent) was measured by 
the actual sales prices of serviced vacant lots. Thus Badcock claimed to 
have identified a rent (or, more precisely, value) gap in Adelaide when 
he showed that the values of bare parcels in the inner city exceeded the 
total property values of land parcels with houses. This gap contracted 
and closed between 1975 and 1980. 
Badcock mentions that in inner Adelaide in 1970 "the housing 
stock was dominated by undersized allotments and subject to an 
encumbrance prohibiting redevelopment where they fell below a 
minimum size" (Badcock, 1990, p. 460). This suggests that combined 
house and land values in inner Adelaide were low relative to vacant lot 
values due to legal restrictions on redevelopment of the former. This 
does not imply anything about any differences between actual (contract) 
and potential (land) rent, if legal feasibility is a condition of potential 
use . After the restrictions were removed, the so-called rent gap 
disappeared. Instead of closure of a gap between actual and potential 
rent, this should be characterized as a change in potential rent. Feasible 
uses after removal of the restrictions were more intensive than the 
feasible uses while the redevelopment prohibitions remained in force. 
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CONCLUSION: ALTERNATIVES TO THE RENT GAP 
Where does all of this leave the rent gap hypothesis? The notion 
of a rent gap relies on a concept of rent that depends on the current use 
of land. But, as Tideman argues: "Such a definition has no special 
virtue from the perspective of theory and does not correspond to 
anything that might plausibly be observed empirically" (Tideman, 1982, 
p. 109). Although the latter part of Tideman's remark may be 
overstated, it is not surprising to note that attempts to apply the rent gap 
hypothesis in empirical studies of gentrification have encountered 
severe measurement problems. In regard to the more fundamental 
point, the concept of actual rent adds nothing to our understanding of 
gentrification because it explains nothing that was not already 
understood in more coherent terms. As Ley concluded in 1987: 
The devalorization cycle and the mystique around the rent gap 
now become unnecessary baggage. All that is now required for 
gentrification to occur is the potential for profit. This bears 
striking similarity to neoclassical accounts of developer 
behaviour and as such it is a claim that can be assessed using 
conventional indicators (Ley, 1987, p. 468). 
Indeed, the standard neoclassical account of land use succession does not 
rely on any distinction between actual and potential rent or value. In 
the standard analysis, a property can be profitably rehabilitated or 
redeveloped only if: 
V n - Cn ;;::: V c + De, 
where: V c is the market value of a site and the building currently on it 
(the subscript c refers to current use); Vn is the expected market value 
of the same site and either a rehabilitated or a new building on it (n 
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refers to the new use); De is the cost of demolishing the current 
building if it is to be replaced by a new building (De = 0 if the current 
building is retained and rehabilitated); and Cn is the cost of 
rehabilitating the existing building or constructing the new building, 
exclusive of the cost of purchasing and - in the case of a new building 
- clearing the site.20 
It should be understood that, in this formula, land use change 
does not depend on the existence of a gap between actual and potential 
rent, only between current and potential, feasible land uses. Because 
land rent and value change as soon as perceptions about the future 
change and do not wait for land use to change, the site values contained 
in V c and V n are identical - both are based on potential, rather than 
actual, use. Any difference between the two is due solely to the possible 
differences between the value of the current and the new (or 
rehabilitated) buildings. Admittedly, like the rent gap hypothesis, the 
formula does not go very far in explaining why gentrification does or 
does not actually take place. In other words, neither approach explains 
how neighbourhoods previously subject to disinvestment come to be 
perceived to have the potential for reinvestment and higher land rents. 
Detailed historical analyses of the reasons for and impacts of changes in 
potential values and rents - such as Hamnett and Randolph's (1986) 
study of inner London or Zukin's (1982) of New York's SoHo - are 
needed to properly explain specific processes of gentrification. 
In conclusion, it should be noted that this paper is not intended as 
a neoclassical critique of Marxian urban economics. Although I have 
maintained that the neoclassical concept of urban land use succession is 
more coherent theoretically than Smith's rent gap theory, that is not 
20This is based in part on Heilbrun (1974), pp. 282-5 . 
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meant as an implied endorsement of neoclassical explanations of 
gentrification. As has been argued elsewhere (Bourassa, 1992a), 
neither explanations based on neoclassical residential location theory 
nor those based on (the at least ostensibly) Marxian rent gap theory 
provide a satisfactory account of gentrification. In fact, these 
competing explanations suffer from analogous problems. On the one 
hand, the Marxian theory fails to explore the origins of potential rent 
- that is, it does not explain how it historically becomes profitable to 
rehabilitate or redevelop inner-city neighbourhoods. On the other 
hand, the neoclassical theory, with its assumption of consumer 
sovereignty, fails to explore the origins of the tastes that underlie 
consumer demands. In each case, the theory fails to address and explain 
the most fundamental and interesting aspects of the phenomenon in 
question: namely, the sources of the changes in value that constitute 
gentrification. 
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